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Abstract
In-game purchases, virtual currency, content
design for heterogeneous consumers and strong
competition are key challenges for mobile game
providers. This study addresses determination of
optimal game design strategies for game providers in
the presence of heterogeneous players and copycat
competitors. Moreover, this paper incorporates
pricing of virtual goods/currency into the Free-toPlay (F2P) mobile game design via a duopoly model
and characterizes the optimal strategies for game
providers in terms of pricing of virtual
goods/currency and the game challenge level.

1. Introduction
The digital game industry is growing at a very
fast rate bringing in $83.6 Billion in 2014 and was
expected to increase by 19.1% to $99.6 Billion in
2016 [6]. The way digital games are played has
evolved during the past few years as the sales of
mobile devices have increased dramatically. While
PC gaming and console gaming are still leaders in the
way that digital games are played, the mobile gaming
segment has been steadily increasing with 966
million players worldwide [12], bringing in revenue
of $34.8 billion. Top mobile games can be very
successful in generating significant revenue,
Supercells games’ Clash of Clans and Hay Day
generated $2.4 million a day [17]. The dominant way
for mobile games to earn revenue has been shifting
from the traditional pay outright for the game to a
free to play model, which earns revenue through
micro transactions.
The main difference between mobile F2P and
console games is that there is no free trial for players;
instead players download the entire game for free [3].
Thus, there are no barriers for players to download
and start playing an F2P mobile game. Players can
still play the entire game without spending real
money; however, many players are willing to buy
virtual goods/currency to speed up their game
progression. In today’s mobile game market, F2P
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game developers prefer as many players as possible
present in the game due to network effect, because
most F2P games are massively multiplayer online
games. Therefore, these mobile games are totally free
to download without any free-trial period.
This study focuses on F2P mobile games
generating revenue from selling virtual currency (i.e.
diamonds, crystals that can be used to purchase
armor, equipment or faster leveling in game) or
virtual goods. In-app purchases will be the number
one revenue source for mobile apps while paid apps
will account for 37.8% and ad based revenue will
account for 14% at the end of 2017 [11]. Therefore,
our study only focuses on revenue generated by
selling virtual currency/goods in F2P mobile games.
This study’s main contribution is providing a
framework for a game provider facing strong
competition and heterogeneous players.
This study incorporates pricing of virtual
goods/currency into the F2P mobile game design via
a duopoly model and characterizes the optimal
strategies for game providers in terms of pricing of
virtual goods/currency and the game challenge level.
The purpose of our monopoly and duopoly models is
to explore strategies and provide managerial insights
for the original game providers in pricing of virtual
goods and setting challenge level of the F2P mobile
games. In the duopoly model, we investigate a
commonly observed practice, where the copycat
game providers compete against the original game
providers through duplicating the game mechanism
of the original game. We reveal the optimal pricing
and game design strategies for both the original and
copycat game providers engaged in a duopoly
competition. In addition, we show that there should
be a reasonable first-mover advantage for the original
game provider to create original games.
We review the literature in Section 2; then, our
modeling approach and results are presented in
Sections 3. We conclude our study with a discussion,
managerial implications for game providers and
future research directions in Section 4.
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2. Literature Review
Regarding current research in digital games, most
of the literature focuses on traditional computer and
console games, studies embracing virtual currency,
game design and competition among F2P game
providers are very limited. The goal of this literature
review is to show that this paper fills a gap in mobile
game (specifically F2P games) design incorporating
pricing of virtual goods/currency for both monopoly
and duopoly cases. In a recent article, Guo et al. [7]
study a monopoly game provider’s problem of selling
virtual currency to players who enjoy leisure and earn
virtual currency. They conclude that decreasing the
virtual currency price and increasing the number of
virtual goods would improve game providers’
revenue. Finneran and Zhang [6] provide a review of
promises and challenges of studying flow, a
psychological
state,
in
computer-mediated
environments and cautions researchers to investigate
hidden assumptions of theories in other disciplines.
Agarwal and Karahanna [1] use a structural
equation analysis to examine cognitive absorption of
information technology use based on temporal
dissociation,
focused
immersion,
heightened
enjoyment, control, and curiosity. They propose that
playfulness and personal innovativeness are key
determinates of cognitive absorption. Liu et al. [13]
argue that competition is the key factor of game
design that should be incorporated into organizational
activity games such as employee training games.
This paper only focuses on F2P games on mobile
devices. Regarding game satisfaction and virtual
currency in F2P games, researchers have been
studying motivations of playing the games and
impacts of virtual currency and promotions. Yee [18]
presents that achievement, social environment and
immersion components are main reasons for playing
video games. Moreover, Ryan et al. [15] demonstrate
that game enjoyment; autonomy, competence and
relatedness are important factors for intentions to
play video games. Besides players’ intentions to play
these video games, Moon et al. [14] propose
ownership-enhancing and socialization-enhancing
strategies to improve player commitment in playing
the game.
Considering virtual currency and promotions in
video games, Guo and Barnes [8] model consumer’s
behavior buying virtual currency via a mixture of
new constructs and established theories, including
theory of planned behavior, technology acceptance
model, trust theory and unified theory of acceptance
and use of technology. Additionally, Hamari and
Lehdonvirta [10] focus on marketing of virtual goods
for F2Ps due to untapped potential for marketing of

virtual goods and Hamari [9] investigates purchase
behavior for virtual goods in three F2P game
environments: social networking, first-person shooter
and social virtual world games.
This paper examines micro transactions in digital
games, specifically in F2P mobile games. This study
is positioned in the interface of information systems,
e-commerce, and economics literature. This study
also characterizes the optimal strategies for game
providers in terms of pricing of virtual
goods/currency, game challenge level and threat from
copycat game providers.

3. Duopoly Model
Cloning is as old as the video game industry
itself. In the mobile game market, the problem of
copycat games is an even more staggering problem
due to familiarity with the popular games and an
increased chance of capturing the attention of players
(e.g., Pokémon Go vs. Citymon Go, Clash of Clans
vs. Game of War, Super Mario Bros vs Super Max,
2048 vs. Threes etc.) [2]. With a seemingly infinite
number of games on mobile platforms, it is quite
common to see many games which are extremely
similar to each other, particularly when you consider
the features of the gameplay mechanics. Analyzing a
duopoly case in our problem coincides with the
copycat problem of the F2P mobile game market. In
our model, there are two game providers, A and B,
whose F2P games are competing for the same
market. Thus, the game providers need to make their
decisions not only to capture market share and
generate revenue from players buying virtual
goods/currency, but also to consider the strategy of
the other game providers.
In mobile games, we observe that the amount of
virtual goods purchased by consumers vary from
player to player. To model the “free to play” virtual
game scenario, we first require that consumers be
heterogeneous in their gaming challenge level
preferences. Let θ represents individual player’s
preference about the challenge level of the game,
which is assumed to be distributed uniformly
between 0 and 1. Hence, the population density is
normalized at 1. Players are heterogeneous in θ, this
follows from the classic Shapiro’s [16] treatment of
consumers’ heterogeneous tastes for product
qualities. Players may consume different amount of
virtual goods/currency depending on the actual game
challenge level relative to individual player’s
personal preference. This is also the departing point
for our model from the existing literature (e.g., [7,
8]), where players are often assumed to consume
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either zero or one quantity of the game’s virtual
goods/currency. A mobile game player may not play
the game at all if the game is deemed as too difficult
for a beginner or too easy for a more experienced
player. Hence, the actual game challenge level has an
impact on the potential market size for the game.
Therefore, we treat the actual game challenge level γ
as one of the two decision variables of the game
providers in addition to the unit price p for the virtual
goods/currency.
The game challenge level will cause disutility to a
player in both directions when the game challenge
level set by the provider and player’s preference on
the game challenge level are not equal to each other.
When a game fails to meet a player’s preconception,
either by being too easy or too challenging for that
player, it often causes frustration to the player’s game
experience. Lowering the challenge level to “Easy”
can feel humiliating to a self-titled “hardcore” player,
as raising the challenge level to “Hard” would be
unthinkable to a “casual” one. When the game
challenge level is higher than a player’s preferred
challenge level, the player may choose to purchase a
certain amount of virtual goods/currency to align the
game’s challenge level with the player’s preferred
challenge level and therefore improve the player’s
utility. Meanwhile, if the game challenge level is
lower than a player’s preferred challenge level, then
the player will not purchase any virtual
goods/currency as doing so will only decrease a
player’s utility.
Without loss of generality, we assume game
provider B creates a copycat game of provider A;
thus, the problem is modeled as a three-stage
Stackelberg game. In Stage 1, the original game
provider A announces the game challenge level γA
and the unit price for the virtual goods/currency pA
for its game. In stage 2, the copycat announces game
challenge level γB and the unit price for the virtual
goods/currency pB for its game observing the
strategies adopted by provider A. In stage 3, players
decide which game to play and choose the amount of
virtual goods/currency GA and GB to purchase. The
duopoly case is solved by backward induction.

3.1. Player’s Decision in Stage 3
By backward induction, first we solve the player’s
decision problem in Stage 3 assuming the game
challenge levels (both original and copycat games)
and the unit prices for the virtual goods/currency are
already observed by players. A player’s utility
function has the following forms depending on the
choice of the F2P game, UA=V-c(γA-θ-GA)2-pAGA or

UB=V-s-c(γB-θ-GB)2-pBGB, as s is the discounted
utility for the copycat game.
We assume a penalty s > 0 for the gross utility of
the copycat game. This is because the original game
often offers a larger player base and is deemed by
players as more valuable due to positive network
effects. Furthermore, most F2P mobile games are
multiplayer, there are already more players playing
the original game when the copycat game is
introduced. Hence, the copycat game provider will
suffer for not being first to market. In our analysis,
we also choose to focus on the duopoly competition
between the original game and the copycat when the
market is fully covered. An original game with large
gross utility often enjoys an initial release success,
which not only attracts a lot of players but also draws
copycat competitors due to its popularity. Hence, in
F2P games if an original game is indeed very popular
then a copycat game is almost guaranteed to show up,
hence a duopoly competitor.
Since UA and UB are concave in GA and GB
respectively, the optimal amount of virtual
goods/currency purchased by the player is found by
solving the first order conditions and the optimal
solutions are GA*=γA-θ-(pA/2c) and GB*=γB-θ-(pB/2c).
Setting GA*=0 and GB*=0, we find the indifference
points (θUA and θUB) for players purchasing virtual
goods/currency as θUA=γA-(pA/2c) and θUB=γB-(pB/2c).

3.2. Copycat’s Decision in Stage 2
The copycat game provider’s objective is to
optimize its revenue using both its game’s challenge
level and the pricing of the game’s virtual
goods/currency. If the copycat provider sets the unit
price for its virtual goods higher than the original
game provider, then the duopoly game is expected to
be dominated by the original game provider. This is
because players already perceive the copycat game as
the less valuable product (due to the discount factor
s), if the virtual goods in copycat game are more
expensive, players would have no incentive to play
the copycat game. Therefore, we choose to focus on
the case where pB≤pA.
Considering to ensure that the copycat game
provider’s revenue is positive, there exists an upper
bound such that pB< 2cγB-√(pA2-4cpA γA+4c(s+cγB2 )).
Note that this upper bound on pB is smaller than the
lower bound on pA. Therefore, the price set on the
virtual goods/currency sold by the original game
provider is always going to be greater than the
copycat game provider i.e., pA>pB, which is
consistent with our previous assumption. The copycat
game must offer virtual goods/currency at a cheaper
price than the original game to have positive revenue.
Page 1352

Failing to provide cheaper virtual goods/currency
will result in players choosing to participate only in
the original game.
According to our analysis, the optimal price and
challenge level for the copycat provider depends on
the original game provider’s challenge level and
price. The copycat provider’s optimal price will be
lower than the original game provider’s price; hence,
this will allow the copycat to attract players. There
exists an optimal game challenge level for the
copycat provider in response to the original game
providers’ strategies set in Stage 1.

3.3. Original Game Provider’s Decision in
Stage 1
In Stage 1, the original game provider A sets its
price and challenge level with the expectation that a
copycat game will show up in Stage 2. The revenue
function of the original game provider is derived
based on the targeted market between [θi, θUA]. The
original game provider’s optimal pA and γA can be
found by substituting the optimal pB* and γB* (found
in Stage 2) into RA and then we solve the revenue
maximization problem for the original game
provider.
The upper bound of pA is derived based on the
constraint that 0<θi<1 and the lower bound of pA is
derived based on the constraint that θUA> θi. Solving
the above maximization problem, we obtain the
optimal unit price for the original game provider such
that pA*= (2/15) (7c-2√(c2+15cs)). Since the revenue
function RA is convex in γA, the interior optimal
solution of γA* do not exist. As a result, we analyze
the optimal γA* as well as the optimal unit price pA*
numerically.
𝑅"
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Figure 2. The Change of the Orginal Game
Provider’s Revenue Function with respect to pA
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the change of the
original game provider’s revenue function with
respect to γA and pA. We set c=0.35, pA=0.11 s=0.1 in
Figure 1 and c=0.35, γA=1, s=0.1 in Figure 2. The
revenue function RA as shown in Figure 1 is convex
in γA. Starting approximately at γA=0.33, the original
game provider may choose to raise the game
challenge level to increase its overall revenue.
Moreover, raising the game challenge level to the
highest value leads to the possible maximized
revenue. This indicates the optimal solution for the
game challenge level is found at γA*=1. In another
word, it is in the original game provider’s best
interest to offer the most challenging game in the
duopoly setting. Furthermore, if the original game
provider does not set γA to the upper bound value, the
copycat provider will steal market share by cutting
the price of its virtual goods/currency. That is not a
desirable situation for the original game provider;
thus, the challenge level γA should be the maximum
feasible value based on previously set parameters.
Also illustrated in Figure 2, although the revenue
function RA is not strictly concave in pA, the optimal
value for the unit price pA that maximizes the original
game provider’s revenue does exist (approximately at
pA = 0.11) in the shown example, which is consistent
with the closed form solution presented previously,
pA*= (2/15) (7c-2√(c2+15cs)).

3.4. Impact of First-Mover Advantage, s
𝛾"
Figure 1. The Change of the Orginal Game
Provider’s Revenue Function with respect to γA

Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the discount
factor s on the revenues of the two game providers. In
Figure 3, we set c=0.35, pA=0.11 and γA=1, the red
line represents the original game provider’s revenue
and the black line represents the copycat game
provider’s revenue.
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RB > RA, game providers
have no incentive to
become the first mover in
stage 1, hence there will be
no game for players to
play.

RA > RB, the original game
provider now has incentive
to become the first mover.
Copycat provider therefore
has a game to “copy” in
stage 2

𝑠̂
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Figure 3. The Critical Threshold Value of the
Discount factor s that Provide First Mover Advantage
As shown in Figure 3, when the first-mover
advantage is small, the revenue of the copycat game
provider’s revenue is higher than the original game
provider. If the discount factor value is known to the
original game provider beforehand, then the original
game provider is better off as a copycat. Thus, no
original game would be introduced to the market at
all. The discount factor or penalty s reflects a firstmover advantage for the original game provider. To
ensure that there is a healthy market in which original
games will continue to be produced, the industry can
examine the use of regulations. For example, by
regulating the release time of games, the industry can
potentially ensure that a reasonable high first-mover
advantage and prevent market failure.
While this study does not recommend regulation,
it’s potentially in the industries’ best interest to
examine possible use of regulations to sustain a
healthy mobile game market. The larger the first
mover advantage the more incentive for the original
game provider to develop brand new games. The
original game provider may pursue legal methods
through copyright or patent protection to secure a
penalty from the copycat provider so that the
discount factor is big enough to provide necessary
incentives. But often, the copycat game only clones
the gameplay and mechanics of the original game,
which is not copyrightable or enforceable. Thus, the
original game provider should consider investing
more in the content of the game so that it will take
longer and make it harder for the copycat provider to
clone. By releasing the game first into the market, the
original game provider also enjoys the first mover
advantage in building up its play base. In choosing
F2P mobile games, players often favor the game with
bigger player base. From the copycat game

providers’ perspective, it is in their best interest to
reduce the first mover advantage received by the
original game provider. Copycat game provider may
achieve this by releasing the cloning version of the
game soon after the release of the original game
before the original game builds up dominated player
base. This practice is often observed in real world,
when a popular mobile game is released a copycat
game tends to follow quickly. For example, Clash of
Clans was released in August 2012 and less than a
year later Game of War was released in July 2013.
When comparing the revenue of the two games in
2015, Clash of Clans came out ahead with $1.345
billion while Game of Ware made $799 million [4].

4. Conclusion
Revenue generation in F2P games is a
challenging task for game providers due to
heterogeneous consumers and strong competition
from copycat games. In this study, we characterize
optimal strategies for a monopoly game provider and
for both the original and copycat game providers in a
duopoly case.
In the duopoly model, we focus on popular F2P
games with rich content. We show that there exists a
pair of optimal solutions for the copycat provider’s
decision problem. To maximize revenue, both the
optimal game challenge level and the optimal unit
price for the virtual goods/currency should be set by
copycat provider in observation of original game
provider’s strategy. It is also shown that there is an
upper bound on the price of the copycat game
provider, which regulates the unit price for virtual
goods/currency set by copycat provider should be
cheaper than that of the original game. Regarding the
original game provider’s strategy, we show that an
optimal unit price for the virtual goods/currency does
exist for the original game and the original game
provider should set the challenge level of the game to
the highest value possible to maximize its expected
revenue anticipating copycat provider will cut its
price in the duopoly setting. Moreover, we conclude
that there should be a reasonable first mover
advantage (in the form of discounted value to copycat
games) for the original providers in order for them to
create original games.
This study is not without its limitation. Although
it integrates pricing decisions with F2P game design
and heterogonous players, our model does not take
players adaptive behaviors into consideration. Players
may improve their playing skills hence modify their
preferred game challenge levels as they become more
skilled with gameplay mechanics, which in turn
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could affect game providers’ strategies. Moreover,
our model assumes the discount factor is the same for
all players, but in actuality it might be different. In
addition to this assumption, the duopoly case analysis
is limited to popular F2P games with rich content.
For future research, it will be interesting to expand
the model to include players with multiple accounts
for the same game and players playing both games in
the duopoly case.
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